

## **Statement/Intervention by India at the Conference on Disarmament, Subsidiary Body 2 - Geneva, 11 February 2025**

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**Mr. Coordinator,**

India congratulates you on assuming the role of Coordinator of Subsidiary Body 2. We look forward to working under your stewardship and assure you of our fullest support.

We appreciate your consultative approach.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

My delegation would have preferred an explicit, unambiguous, and clear reference to a FMCT in the topics under Subsidiary Body 2.

It is imperative to build on our past work in this Conference including CD/2139 and commence negotiations in the CD on an FMCT based on CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein.

India looks forward to in-depth discussions on a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty in subsequent meetings of this SB. We will be speaking on specific points in greater detail at a later stage.

**Mr Coordinator,**

Without prejudice to the priority that India attaches to nuclear disarmament, we support the negotiation in the CD, the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, of a universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT) that meets India's national security interests.

Our support for FMCT negotiations in the CD is consistent with India's interest in strengthening the global non-proliferation regime that would add a measure of strategic predictability and a baseline for future global nuclear disarmament efforts. Given this objective and given the CD's vocation, it is essential that all relevant countries participate in these negotiations in the CD and contribute to its successful outcome.

UNGA resolution 48/75L adopted by consensus in 1993 envisaged FMCT as a significant contribution to non-proliferation in all its aspects. India co-sponsored this resolution and has supported all subsequent FMCT resolutions in the UNGA.

India supported the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee on an FMCT in the CD in 1995 and in 1998 and agreed on CD/1864 in 2009, which provided inter alia for establishment of a Working Group to negotiate an FMCT. India participated in the work of the Subsidiary Body 2 on FMCT in 2018, 2022 and 2024 and joined consensus on CD/2139.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

The UNGA Resolution 48/75 L reflected with clarity the common understanding of the basic objective of the treaty. The mandate for the proposed treaty was reflected in this resolution and reconfirmed by the Shannon Report in CD/1299 i.e. to “negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.

India is opposed to reopening this mandate as it provides a clear and feasible basis for taking forward negotiations on what is a very complex subject.

The obligations and responsibilities arising from the treaty must apply in a non-discriminatory manner to all States Parties directly affected by the treaty’s obligations and responsibilities. The treaty would be global in character. An FMCT is not a regional arms control treaty.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

The treaty should allow the unhindered production of fissile material for permitted purposes under the treaty on a non-discriminatory basis. This would include the production of fuel for civil nuclear energy without prejudice to the variety of fuel cycles currently in use or envisaged for the future. Permitted purposes should also include non-proscribed activities such as production and use of fuel for naval propulsion.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

India has actively participated in every relevant forum on this subject, including the GGE on FMCT established pursuant to the UNGA resolution 67/53 and the HLEPG on FMCT established pursuant to the UNGA resolution 71/259 and welcomed their respective reports A/70/81 and A/73/159 adopted by consensus.

The Reports of the GGE on FMCT and the HLEPG on FMCT, underlined that the Treaty and its negotiation in the CD remains a priority enjoying broad international support and that the CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, remains the most suitable basis on which future negotiations should commence. In our view, this was the most significant conclusion of these consensus reports.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

As to the suggestions for declaring a moratorium, India would like to underline that a moratorium on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, cannot be a substitute for an FMCT. A moratorium by its very nature is voluntary, reversible and not verifiable, unlike an FMCT which will impose a treaty obligation, and will be verifiable and irreversible.

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**Statement by India 18 March 2025**  
**Practical and political measures**

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**Thank you, Coordinator,**

1. Without diminishing in any way the priority we attach to nuclear disarmament, my delegation supports the negotiation in the CD of an FMCT on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. Like others, we will also assess the outcome of these negotiations from the perspective of our national security.
2. India's support for FMCT negotiations in the CD is consistent with our interest in strengthening the global non-proliferation regime that would add a measure of strategic predictability and a baseline for future global nuclear disarmament efforts.
3. The verification regime of an FMCT could, for instance, serve as a building block for eventual nuclear disarmament verification. Thus, it would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament but would not in itself be a disarmament measure - for which a separate, more comprehensive instrument would be required.
4. The mandate in CD/1299 requires that the treaty be non-discriminatory. Thus, the obligations and responsibilities arising from the treaty must apply in a non-discriminatory manner, in particular to all States parties directly affected by the treaty's obligations and responsibilities. The treaty would be global in character thus excluding any regional specificity.
5. The treaty should include all States which are essential stakeholders for the treaty and thus critical for universal adherence.
6. The dynamic correlation between scope, definitions and verification will be an important factor in the treaty, while taking into account the costs of implementing the treaty. The treaty should not place an undue burden on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or on non-proscribed military activities.
7. The treaty will stand on its own. It is neither a derivative nor an adjunct of any other existing treaty. In fact, this treaty is sought to be negotiated precisely because of the gaps and infirmities in existing instruments.
8. India participated in the GGE and the HLEPG on FMCT and welcomes the substantive work undertaken by the Groups and its reports. The work of the GGE and HLEPG, however, do not amount to either pre-negotiations or negotiations on an FMCT, which in our view, should take place in the CD on the basis of the agreed mandate. The expert groups have nonetheless brought to bear varied but enriching perspectives on various aspects of a future treaty thus deepening our understanding of its many complexities, which only a serious and interactive discussion can bring forth.

9. The reports have underlined that the treaty and its negotiation in the CD remains a priority enjoying broad international support and CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein remains the most suitable basis on which future negotiations should commence. In our view, that was the most significant conclusion of the GGE.
10. We hope that the outcomes of the HLEPG, as well as the GGE, which is the result of the most thorough inter-governmental assessment of an FMCT, will be taken forward for the eventual commencement of FMCT negotiations at the earliest in this Conference.
11. India believes that TCBMs are not and cannot be a substitute for the commencement of negotiations in the CD for a legally binding treaty on FMCT. What would constitute core elements of the Treaty cannot be addressed outside the CD negotiations, or in a piece-meal form as confidence building measures. The HLEPG on FMCT has noted that TCBMs, which States may or may not decide to include in a treaty, need to be clearly distinguished from mandatory obligations against which compliance may be assessed.
12. The FMCT itself constitutes a TCBM to enhance strategic trust among all states possessing nuclear weapons. It will enhance trust between possessors and non-possessors by conveying a legally-binding and internationally and effectively verifiable assurance regarding the ban on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, which when universally implemented would generate invaluable trust and confidence for the international community to proceed towards the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons through an universal, non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable Nuclear Weapons Convention.
13. The best TCBM would be by committing ourselves to negotiations in the CD as per CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. As such India supports dialogue amongst all relevant stakeholders to enable the early commencement of negotiations on the basis of CD 1299- the agreed mandate in the Conference on Disarmament, and until formal negotiations begin, in-depth and focused discussions in the CD on technical aspects such as verifications tools and technics, evolving technologies for verification, declaration formats, management of fuel cycles, possible organisational issues etc – not as standalone CBMs, but as an informal dialogue that which would better prepare member states for the eventual commencement of CD negotiations.
14. While we support the commencement of negotiations on FMCT in the CD on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein, India does not support call for voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, as such a moratoria, by its very nature will be voluntary, reversible, and not verifiable, unlike an FMCT that will impose a treaty obligation and which will be verifiable and irreversible. In the absence of such legally agreed verification measures, declared moratoria may in fact increase distrust amongst

members states prompting them to take measures that may run counter to the objective of early commencement of FMCT negotiations in the CD.

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**Statement by India on 20 March 2025,  
Legally binding agreement: General and technical aspects**

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In my intervention, I will focus on sharing our views on general and technical aspects of FMCT.

1. We support negotiation in the Conference of an FMCT on the basis of CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. The basic objective of the treaty will be to end all the future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
2. FMCT, as set out in CD/1299, must be universal, non-discriminatory, and internationally verifiable. The obligations and responsibilities arising from the treaty must apply to all in a non-discriminatory manner.
3. The treaty would be global in character. It should include all relevant states which are essential stakeholders for its universal adherence.
4. While FMCT is not in and of itself a disarmament measure, it would be an important step towards nuclear disarmament.
5. FMCT would have a primary goal of strengthening non-proliferation in all its aspects. It would strengthen the global non-proliferation regime, adding a measure of strategic predictability and baseline for global nuclear disarmament efforts.
6. Definitions under FMCT will have to be negotiated for this specific purpose of the treaty. The definitions under the treaty will not be a purely technical issue but will have various dimensions including inter-alia political, legal, and scientific dimensions.
7. The dynamic correlation between scope, definitions and verification will be an important factor in the treaty, while taking into account the costs of implementing the treaty.
8. The treaty should not place an undue burden on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy or on non-proscribed military activities. This would include production of fuel for civil nuclear energy without prejudice to the variety of fuel cycles currently in use or envisaged for the future.
9. Verification will be an important element of treaty's architecture. It will flow naturally from the object and purpose of the treaty which should be designed to provide

necessary assurance regarding compliance. It will serve the dual purposes of detection and deterrence, including against willful non-compliance and spurious allegations and counter allegations against non-compliance.

10. Verification architecture and its components would have to strike a balance between effectiveness, cost as well as acceptability in the light of national security, developmental and/ or proliferation concerns, as also protection of national confidential information.

11. In our view, there is a merit in establishing a treaty-based, independent, separate, and self-contained FMCT Organization (FMCTO), that is self-sufficient in legal authority and financial and human resources capable of supporting effective implementation of the treaty.

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**Statement by India 3 June 2025**  
**Legally binding agreement: Technical and institutional Aspects**

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**Mr. Coordinator,**

Before I begin, I want to thank you for steering our work.

I will continue from our deliberations in the last meeting.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

Verification will flow naturally from the object and purpose of the treaty. As stated in the Shannon Mandate, this relates to a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

This is different from the rationale for IAEA safeguards which aim at ensuring peaceful uses of nuclear material by applying safeguards to declared material for detecting and deterring diversion to potential military use (in the case of NNWS) or actual military use (in the case of voluntary offers/INFCIRC 66 types). In fact, the very rationale for an FMCT is that States with unsafeguarded facilities are not willing to apply safeguards and /or the Additional Protocol.

While the IAEA experience toolbox will have relevance and value for an FMCT, however there can be no direct superimposition. A common agreed verification standard would have to be decided during the treaty negotiations; a standard that is credible, cost effective and acceptable and that fits the purpose of the treaty.

This does not imply undermining or diluting any other verification standard.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

I have the following 7 points on the verification framework of the Treaty: -

1. Verification mechanism will serve the dual purposes of detection and deterrence against non-compliance and spurious allegations of non-compliance.
2. Production for prohibited purposes, diversion as well as transfers for prohibited purposes would be covered.
3. The verification architecture and its components would have to strike a balance between effectiveness, cost as well as acceptability in the light of concerns with regard to national security and/or proliferation as also protection of national confidential information.
4. The number of facilities to be verified will depend on the scope and objective of the eventual FMCT and the costs involved. Enrichment and reprocessing facilities will have to be verified but there may be a need for monitoring additional facilities, particularly upstream facilities, for additional confidence. Certain developments, particularly concerns related to some nuclear fuel cycle activities, reinforce this need.
5. Naval propulsion would need to be covered appropriately.
6. Verification should focus on material from the point of production, wherever it is placed in the nuclear fuel cycle and move forward with material accountancy and channelization in the manner of a pursuit clause, which would cover all possible pathways. This should address various elements of risk involved without undermining the non-discriminatory nature of the treaty or the conceptual and functional integrity of the verification regime.
7. Since not all Nuclear Weapons States have separated their civil and military facilities, verification of undeclared facilities may pose specific difficulties.

**Mr. Coordinator,**

I have the following 5 points on the possible institutional structure of the Treaty: -

1. There would be merit in establishing a treaty based separate, independent and self-contained FMCTO that is self-sufficient in legal authority and financial and human resources capable of supporting effective implementation of the treaty.
2. The relationship between the treaty's obligations and its implementation including verification should be addressed as an integral whole in the treaty so that the States parties have a sense of ownership and to ensure that the

treaty is implemented in a credible and effective manner on a non-discriminatory basis.

3. An FMCTO could enter into cooperation agreements with other international organizations including with the IAEA for cooperation in specific areas identified in the treaty.
4. An FMCTO would be separate from and not subordinate to the IAEA.
5. Along the lines of OPCW, an FMCTO could have a DG and Secretariat which has both technical functions including verification, as well as other support functions.

I thank you, Mr. Coordinator.

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